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Abstract
This paper argues that barriers aﬀect both the beginning date and the subsequent
pace of modern growth, and taking into account this fact enriches our knowledge of
cross-country income diﬀerences. The model matches the observed inverted U-shape
of cross-country income diﬀerences, which implies that a substantial fraction of current
income diﬀerences is transitional. Hence, the model requires smaller barriers to account
for current income diﬀerences relative to models that focus only on steady states. Em-
pirically, I find that diﬀerences in the beginning dates of modern growth explain large
diﬀerences in incomes.
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1 Introduction
Models of international income diﬀerences focus on the steady state eﬀect of barriers to cap-
ital accumulation and technology adoption1 ignoring an important long run development
fact: countries that have experienced modern growth (a sustained increase in per capita
output) also experienced a long period of extensive growth (growth in aggregate terms but
stagnation in per capita terms) before it. Moreover, countries entered modern growth at dif-
ferent points in time. A parallel literature studies development paths but with no reference
to international income diﬀerences.2 In this paper, I bring elements from both literatures
and study the international income diﬀerences implied by diﬀerences in development paths.
I argue that some countries are poor because of bad institutions or policies that act as barri-
ers to technology adoption and capital accumulation. My key contribution to this literature
is to study the implications of an overlooked consequence of these barriers: the delay in
the process of transition from extensive growth to modern growth. I introduce barriers
into the Hansen and Prescott (1999) model and show that barriers in this model lower the
level of income along the balanced growth path and, more importantly, delay the economy’s
turning point from extensive to modern growth. Because of this second eﬀect, cross-country
income diﬀerences exhibit an inverted U-shape pattern over time. A key implication is that
a substantial fraction of existing income diﬀerences is transitional, and so smaller barriers
are required to account for the observed large cross-country income diﬀerences relative to
models that focus only on steady states. This transitional eﬀect increases significantly when
I include the fact that today’s low-income countries have higher population growth rates
during their early development stage than did tody’s high income countries.
1This literature generally focuses on policies that distort capital accumulation ( e.g., Mankiw et al., (1992),
Chari et al., (1997), Parente et al., (2000)), technology adoption ( e.g., Parente and Prescott (1994)), and
level of total factor productivity (e.g., Hall and Jones (1999), Prescott (1998) ,Parente and Prescott (1999),
and Baier et al., (2003)). McGrattan and Schmit (1998) provided a survey of papers on cross country income
diﬀerences.
2An exception is the work of Lucas (2002) which uses the model by Tamura (1996) to study the evolution
of the relative income distribution by assigning turning points exogenously, and finds that income inequality
exhibits an inverted U-shape. In my model the turning point is endogenously determined. Models on
transition from stagnation to modern growth includes Becker et al., (1990), Goodfriend and McDermott
(1995), Galor and Weil (1998), Jones (1999) and Hansen and Prescott (1999). These models diﬀer in several
aspects regarding the driving forces of the transition to modern growth and whether such transition is
inevitable or not.
2
To illustrate the strength of this model in explaining cross-country income diﬀerences,
I examine the countries in Maddison’s (2001) dataset. I run two tests. First, I derive the
relative size of barriers that are required to explain the observed diﬀerences in turning points
between any two groups of countries. I then compare the income diﬀerences predicted by
the model with the data, and find that the model accounts for about 80 percent of the
income diﬀerences for most of the country groups. Second, I choose Japan to study the
case of a reduction in barriers and Argentina to study the case of an increase in barriers
due to documented institutional changes. The data that I used to change the barriers
are historical data on the relative prices of investment goods. The predicted long run
development experience for each economy matches closely the data.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 documents the long
run development facts as motivation and section 3 presents the model. I discuss the role
of barriers in section 4 and show the potential of the model to account for international
income diﬀerences in Section 5. The empirical studies are in Section 6, and a conclusion
follows in section 7.
2 Motivation
Maddison’s (2001) dataset covers 29 Western European countries, 4 Western Oﬀshoots, 7
Eastern European countries, 15 Successor States of the Former USSR, 44 Latin American
countries, 57 African countries, 41 East Asian countries, and 15 West Asian countries. I
divide these countries into seven groups where Group 1 includes Western Oﬀshoots and
12 Western European countries, Group 2 includes other 17 Western European countries,
Group 3 includes Eastern European countries and the Former USSR, Group 4 includes
Latin American countries, Group 5 is Japan only, Group 6 is Africa and finally Group 7
includes all Asian countries except Japan. Appendix 4 provides the details.
Figure (1) shows that per capita income for all seven groups remained stagnant for a long
period before starting to grow at diﬀerent points in time. This stagnation is not because
there was no growth in total output but because the increase in population oﬀset the increase
in output. A “Malthusian” model therefore matches well world experiences prior to the
19th century. But subsequently countries started to leave this type of stagnation and enter
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modern growth, I refer to the time of entry into modern growth as the turning point. World
income diﬀerences were small prior to the 19th century but because of diﬀerences in turning
points, they started to diverge during the 19th century, a feature emphasized by Pritchett
(1997). Figure (2) plots this for individual countries, which also shows large diﬀerences in the
turning points. As a result of the diﬀerent turning points, income diﬀerences between two
countries exhibit an inverted U-shape pattern over time, a feature of the data emphasized
by Lucas (2002).
The data suggest that the timing of modern growth is crucial for understanding the ob-
served income diﬀerences. To proceed, I use a version of Hansen and Prescott (1999) model
to determine the timing of modern growth. The Hansen-Prescott model has the advan-
tage that it determines the turning point endogenously and behaves asymptotically like the
one-sector Solow model. There are two reasons, however, why the Hansen-Prescott model
cannot be directly used as a model for understanding international income diﬀerences. The
turning point in their model depends on initial land per worker and initial technologies.
But these factors also determine income prior to the turning point. Therefore, it cannot
simultaneously account for both the large diﬀerences in turning points and the small diﬀer-
ences in pre-1800 income levels. Moreover, the model predicts that an economy with a lower
level of income in the pre-modern growth stage reaches its turning point sooner, which is
not consistent with the data. I argue that diﬀerent institutions for investment incentives
can reconcile these facts. This is because capital has a small role to play prior to modern
growth, therefore, diﬀerences in investment incentives also have a small role in determin-
ing the income diﬀerences along the Malthusian path. But they can delay the adoption
of the capital-intensive Solow technology and so explain large post-modern growth income
diﬀerences as a result of the diﬀerences in the turning points.
3 The Model
I focus on barriers to capital accumulation as an explanation why countries are poor and,
in the context of this paper, why modern growth begins later in some countries.3 Barriers
can take the form of taxes on investment goods, corruption or other institutional factors
3 I show later barriers to technology adoption can be introduced in the model in a similar way.
4
that increase the relative price of investment goods, which in turn discourages capital accu-
mulation. In this paper, I follow Parente and Prescott and model barriers by assuming that
they reduce the eﬃciency of transforming forgone consumption goods into usable capital
goods.
Technology Output in this economy can be produced using either the Malthus or the
Solow technologies. Both technologies are subject to exogenous technological change and
both have constant returns to scale. The two production functions are as follows:
Ymt = Amγ
t
mK
φ
mtN
µ
mtL
1−µ−φ
mt ; Yst = Asγ
t
sK
θ
stN
1−θ
st (1)
where Kit, Nit and Lit denote capital, labor and land used in technology i at time t,
φ ∈ (0, 1) is the capital share, µ ∈ (0, 1) is the labor share and 1−µ−φ ∈ (0, 1) is the land
share in the Malthus technology, θ ∈ (0, 1) is the capital share for the Solow technology,
γm > 1 and γs > 1 are the growth rates while Am and As are the initial level of total
factor productivity (TFP). Land does not enter the Solow technology. Capital is assumed
to depreciate completely each period.4 Land is a fixed factor. Output of the two sectors
are identical and can be used for consumption or investment. Feasibility requires
Ct +Xmt +Xst = Ymt + Yst (2)
where Ct is aggregate consumption, while Xmt and Xst are aggregate investments.
Firms in each sector are assumed to behave competitively and rent all factors of pro-
duction from households. A representative firm in sector i takes the wage rate and rental
rates for capital and land as given, and chooses labor, capital and land input to maximize
profits.
Max
Nit,Kit,Lit
Yit − wtNit − rKitKit − rLtLit s.t.(1) i = m, s (3)
Household Sector The model has two-period overlapping generations. Let Nt be the
number of young agents and c1t be the consumption level for young agents in period t.
Population dynamics are given by Nt+1 = g(c1t)Nt, where g(.) is an exogenous function
that will be specified later. In period 0, there are N−1 old agents, each is endowed with
4 In the quantitative work a period is interpreted to be 35 years, so this assumption is empirically reason-
able.
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K0
N−1 units of capital and
L
N−1 units of land. Young agents are born with one unit of labor
time, which they supply inelastically. They make a consumption-saving decision on how
much land and capital to purchase. They become old in the second period where their
sources of income are from renting land and capital to firms and from the sale of land to
the next generation. The barriers are modelled as policy parameters that discourage young
agents from investing. More specifically, for every unit of consumption good a young agent
gives up, he gets 1πm units of Malthus capital and
1
πs unit of Solow capital.
5 In equilibrium,
πm and πs are the relative prices of Malthus and Solow capital goods to consumption
goods. In my international income comparison that follows, πm and πs are allowed to vary
across countries. For each generation t, young agents choose consumption (c1t, c2t+1) and
investment (xmt, xst, lt+1) to maximize lifetime utility,
U (c1t, c2t) = u(c1t) + βu(c2t+1) (4)
subject to the budget constraints
c1t = wt − (xmt + xst + qtlt+1) (5)
c2t+1 = rkmt+1
xmt
πm
+ rkst+1
xst
πs
+ (qt+1 + rLt+1)lt+1 (6)
where β is the discount factor and qt is the price of land in period t.
Equilibrium For given sizes of barriers, the competitive equilibrium and the dynamics
are similar to those of Hansen and Prescott. Readers are referred to Appendix 1 for precise
definition and proofs. I look for an equilibrium where the dynamics of the model are char-
acterized by three development stages. Stage one is the pre-modern growth stage where
the Solow technology is not used and the economy is on a Malthus balanced growth path
(MBGP).6 The exogenous population growth function is chosen such that all the improve-
ment in Malthus TFP is absorbed by population growth. Hence, there is no growth in per
capita terms. Stage two is the transition stage where the level of TFP in the Solow tech-
nology is suﬃciently high relative to the barriers. It becomes profitable to use the Solow
5I allow for diﬀerent barriers in the two sectors to capture the possiblility that policies are biased.
6Because land is always supplied inelastically, in equilibrium it is always profitable to operate the Malthus
technology. Too see this, suppose rLt, rkmt, rKst and wt are equilibrium prices such that the Malthus
technology is not operated. Then since land can only be used in the Malthus technology, there is an excess
supply of land, which implies that these prices cannot be an equilibrium.
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technology and the economy is in transition to modern growth. In stage 3, only the Solow
technology is used and the economy converges to a Solow balanced growth path (SBGP)
asymptotically. The dynamics of the model capture the experience of a rich country that
starts oﬀ with stagnant output per worker, then modern growth begins with an increase
in labor being allocated to the industrial sector, and finally, the economy converges to a
balanced growth path where output per worker is growing at a constant rate.
4 Barriers to Development
This section highlights the role of barriers in the three development stages. Along the
MBGP, the barriers to Malthus capital reduce the capital-output ratio by a factor πm. Let
vm1 be the capital-output ratio for an economy with πm = 1, the output per worker along
the MBGP is
yˆm =
"
Amγ
t
m
µ
vm1
πm
¶φµ
L
Nt
¶1−µ−φ#1/(1−φ)
(7)
which is constant given the assumption that population is growing at rate γ1−µ−φm . The
barriers to Malthus capital reduce this constant level by a factor of πφ/(1−φ)m .
When on the MBGP, firms can determine when it is profitable to start using the Solow
technology. This requires profit to be positive when the wage and rental rate of capital are
at their MBGP levels. The condition is on the level of TFP in the Solow technology:
Ast ≥ (
πs
πm
rˆm
θ
)θ(
wˆm
1− θ )
1−θ (8)
where wˆm and rˆm are the constant wage and rental rate of capital along the MBGP. Let
the turning point t∗ be the period that the Solow technology is first used. the condition
implies
Asγ
t∗
s ≥ Bπθsπ−φ(1−θ)/(1−φ)m
µ
L
N0
¶(1−µ−φ)(1−θ)/(1−φ)
> Asγ
t∗−1
s (9)
where B is a function of technologies and preference parameters. The existence of the
turning point is independent of the relative sizes of the growth rates for the two technologies.
Since the threshold is a constant, the Solow technology will be used at some point as long
as it is growing. Therefore, the model predicts that modern growth is inevitable in all
countries. If countries have access to diﬀerent types of technologies, of course their turning
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points are diﬀerent. But even if they have access to the same technologies, their turning
points can still be diﬀerent, depending on their level of barriers and land per worker.
The two barriers have opposite eﬀects on the turning point. The barriers to Solow
capital delay the turning point but the barriers to Malthus capital speed it up. Intuitively,
if policies favor the Malthus sector relative to the Solow sector, the economy stays on the
MBGP longer. When policies are neutral, referred to as the case of symmetric barriers to
capital accumulation, πm = πs = π. The eﬀect of symmetric barriers on the turning point
is π(θ−φ)/(1−φ), which delays the turning point if and only if the Solow technology is more
capital intensive than the Malthus technology, which I henceforth assume. A higher level
of land per worker delays the turning point because it implies higher wages which makes it
more expensive to start using the Solow technology. So the model has the prediction that
a country with a better endowment of natural resources enjoys a higher living standard in
the pre-modern growth stage but it also stays longer in that stage.
When both technologies are used, the allocation of inputs must equalize marginal prod-
ucts across sectors. Let n∗mt be the equilibrium fraction of labor in the Malthus sector. It
solves
f (nmt) =
µ
1− θπ
θ
sπ
−φ
m ψ
φ (1− (1− ψ)nmt)θ−φ −
Ast
Amt
I
θ−φ
t N
1−θ−µ
t n
1−φ−µ
mt = 0 (10)
where ψ = (1−θ)φθµ and It is total value of investment by the young population at time t− 1.
Assume the Solow technology is growing faster than the Malthus technology, the fraction
of labor in the Malthus sector is decreasing and converges to zero. The two barriers have
opposite eﬀects on this process of structural transformation. The barriers to Solow capital
slow down this process while the barriers to Malthus capital speed up this process. The
eﬀect of the symmetric barriers is captured by πθ−φ, which slow down the process.
Asymptotically, the economy behaves like a one-sector Solow growth economy. Assume
the population growth rate converges to a constant rate, the economy converges to the
SBGP. The barriers to Solow capital reduce the capital-output ratio by a factor πs. Let vs1
be the capital-output ratio for an economy with πs = 1. The output per worker along the
SBGPof an economy with barriers πs is
yˆst =
Ã
Asγ
t
s
µ
vs1
πs
¶θ!1/(1−θ)
(11)
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which is lower by a factor of πθ/(1−θ)s .
5 International Income Diﬀerences
Can the model account for the large observed international income diﬀerences? To answer
this question, I consider two economies that are identical except for the level of their barriers:
economy 1 has πm1 = πs1 = 1, and economy 2 has πm2 = πm and πs2 = πs.
5.1 Analytical Results
In what follows I refer to the ratio of output per worker in economy 1 to output per worker
in economy 2 as their income ratio. Equations (7) and (11) imply that the income ratio is
π
φ/(1−φ)
m along the MBGP, and π
θ/(1−θ)
s along the SBGP. For the case of symmetric barriers
(πm = πs = π), the model predicts higher income ratio along the SBGP than the MBGP.
In other words, even if barriers remain unchanged, the model predicts an increase in the
income ratio because both economies experience a structural transformation with more
capital allocated to the more capital-intensive sector.
That the two-sector barrier model generates the same long-run income ratio as the
standard one-sector barrier model (as in Parente and Prescott (1994)), but crucially for
my purpose, it implies a diﬀerent turning point for each economy. Equation (9) implies a
relationship between the two turning points,7
t∗2 − t∗1 =
ln
³
πθsπ
−φ(1−θ)/(1−φ)
m
´
ln γs
. (12)
If the two economies have the same barriers to Malthus capital, then modern growth is
delayed by θ lnπsln γs periods in economy 2. The income ratio first increases from one, when both
economies use only the Malthus technology, then converges to πθ/(1−θ)s . On the other hand,
if their barriers to Solow capital are the same, modern growth is delayed by
h
φ(1−θ)
(1−φ)
i
lnπm
ln γs
periods in economy 1. The income ratio first decreases from πφ/(1−φ)m , then converges to
one. For the case of symmetric barriers, the relationship between their turning points is
t∗2 − t∗1 =
µ
θ − φ
1− φ
¶
lnπ
ln γs
(13)
7To be more precise, the diﬀerence in their turning point should be the minimum integer that is greater
than
k
ln

πθsπ−φ(1−θ)/(1−φ)m
l
/ ln γs.
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The turning point for economy 2 occurs θ−φ1−φ
lnπ
ln γs
periods later. The income ratio first
increases from πφ/(1−φ), then converges to πθ/(1−θ).8
5.2 Quantitative Results
The benchmark economy with barriers equal to one is identical to that of Hansen and
Prescott. I therefore follow their calibration strategies. Appendix 2 provides a brief review
of the procedure. With the same calibrated parameters, I then compute the equilibrium
path of a distorted economy with barriers bigger than one. For simplification, I assume
barriers to Malthus capital equal to one. This does not change the quantitative results
regarding income diﬀerences along the transition. The reason is that given that the capital
share in the Malthus technology is calibrated to 0.1, the barriers to Malthus capital have
very small eﬀects on both the level of income and the turning point.
In order to set a value for the barriers to capital accumulation in the Solow technology
I use Jones’s (1994) estimate of the maximum relative machinery price in the Summer-
Hetson data set to that of the US for the period 1960-85, which is equal to 4. It turns out,
however, that for the main focus of this paper, which is the contribution of the turning
point to the diﬀerences in income, the precise value chosen for the barrier is not important.
Other authors, in particular Chari, Kehoe and McGrattan (1997) and Restuccia and Urrutia
(2001) use the relative price of investment to consumption goods as a measure for barriers.
Restuccia and Urrutia construct a panel of the relative prices for the period 1960-85 using
the Summer-Hetson data set. They find that the diﬀerences in relative prices across coun-
tries are large. The ratio between the average of the top and bottom five percent of the
distribution of relative prices is 11.3 in 1960 and 6.5 in 1985.9 I report the results for values
of barriers larger than 4 and show that my results are not substantially altered.
Figures (3) - (5) summarize the quantitative results for the case of barriers equals 4.
Figures (3) shows that while the benchmark economy starts to allocate labor to the Solow
8The capital shares have interesting roles in this model. Increasing the capital share of the Malthus
(Solow) technology increases the income ratio along the MBGP (SBGP) and delays the turning point in
economy 1 (2).
9One concern with the investment to consumption measure is that it may overstate the size of barriers if
consumption goods are cheaper in the poor countries because of non-tradable consumption goods that are
produced by labor-intensive technologies. This issue has been addressed by both sets of authors and they
find that this bias is small.
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sector in period 1, the Solow technology is still inactive in the distorted economy until
period 3.10 The Solow technology is actually profitable in the distorted economy between
periods 2 and 3 since the right hand side of equation (12) is equal to 1.3 periods. This
explains why the distorted economy allocates 70 percent (compare to 10 percent for the
benchmark economy) of its labor to the Solow sector during the first period that the Solow
technology is used. The inverted U-shape income ratio in the data is replicated in Figure
(4). The model predicts the income ratio increases from 1 to a maximum of 3.2 before
declining to 2.5. Thus, a bigger income ratio is obtained (a 26 percent diﬀerence) relative
to the balanced growth path level. Figure (5) shows that the growth rate of output per
worker is not monotonic as in the one-sector Solow growth model. It first increases and
then decreases to its balanced growth path rate. The increasing growth rate is a feature
of the data emphasized by Romer (1986).11 It is interesting to note that this model can
produce such an outcome with two constant return to scale technologies.
As the barriers delay the turning point for the distorted economy, the growth rate for
the benchmark economy is higher than that of the distorted economy before it starts to
decrease. Thus, their income ratio increases during this period. After this point, the model
predicts faster growth in the distorted economy so that the income ratio decreases. The
income ratio converges to a constant when both economies converge to their SBGPs. The
inverted U-shape income ratio predicted by the model provides an answer to the question
raised by Restuccia and Urrutia (2001) namely, ‘why the income diﬀerences remain constant
in light of the decline in the level of barriers?’ This is indeed a puzzle if one focuses on the
one-sector barrier model, which predicts income diﬀerences should fall when the barriers
fall. However, these two empirical observations can coexist in the two-sector barriers model.
This is because, as I will show in section 6.2, a decline in the level of barriers may decrease
only the slope of the increasing income ratio but leaving its level constant.
In this model, cross-country income diﬀerences are generated by diﬀerences in balanced
10The fraction of capital in the Malthus sector is proportional to the fraction of labor in the Malthus
sector.
11Romer (1986) tests the trend of the growth rate using raw data from Maddison (1979) for countries
with data no later than 1870. These countries include: United Kingdom, France, Denmark, United States,
Germany, Sweden, Italy, Australia, Norway, Japan and Canada. He rejects the null hypothesis that there is
a nonpositive trend in the growth rate for 8 out of the 11 countries at the 10 percent level.
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growth path levels and diﬀerences in turning points. Income diﬀerences along the balanced
growth path are smaller than along the transition from Malthus to Solow. Table (1) shows
that as barriers increase, the percentage diﬀerence between the income ratio along the SBGP
and the maximum income ratio increases. This is partly due to the longer delay of modern
growth. For example, when the barriers are increased from 8 to 16, the delay in modern
growth increases from 2 to 3 periods, and the percentage diﬀerence in the income ratio rises
from 33 percent to 40 percent. To address the factor 30 income diﬀerences in the data,
Table (2) reports the corresponding combination of capital shares and barriers that can
generate a maximum income ratio of this magnitude.12 It shows that the required size of
barriers needed for a factor 30 income diﬀerence is much lower than in models that focus on
the balanced growth path. For example, for θ equal to 0.4, the required level of barriers is
reduced by 40 percent. The reduction holds true for other levels of θ as well. It is interesting
to note that a factor 30 income diﬀerence is associated with a three- or four-period delay
in the model. In other words, given that rich countries entered modern growth in 1820,
the model predicts that a country that entered modern growth in 1960 would be 30 times
poorer by today’s standards.
I have been focusing on the barriers to capital accumulation to show that the timing of
modern growth is important for understanding the large international income diﬀerences.
Alternatively, some have argued that some countries are poor because there are barriers that
deter technology adoption, which in turn lowers the level of TFP. For example, Parente and
Prescott (1999) have studied the role of unions as barriers to adopting better technology.
The simplest way to incorporate this barrier to technology adoption into this model is to
assume the TFP for the Solow technology is Ast/πA. The interpretation is that the best
Solow technology is not being adopted or the barriers reduce the eﬃciency of using the
Solow technology. At a general level, these two types of models are isomorphic in that one
can choose the size of barriers such that they imply the same output per worker ratio along
the balanced growth path for the two models. In particular, set πA = πθs,where πA and
πs are the barriers to technology adoption and capital accumulation. Then, the delay in
12To be consistent with the calibration procedure, γs and β have to be adjusted when θ is increased.
Therefore, increasing θ need not necessarily increase the delay in modern growth as noted earlier in section
5.1.
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turning points implied by these two models is the same and same quantitative results apply.
The key diﬀerences lie in the representation of these two barriers in the empirical studies.
5.3 Population Profile
The previous quantitative exercise assumed population profiles are the same for both
economies. My focus was to study the eﬀect of barriers holding other factors constant.
The analysis in Appendix 3 shows that my main result is sensitive to changes in the pop-
ulation profile. In particular, when the maximum population growth rate is increased by
1 percent for both economies, the maximum income ratio increases from 3.2 to 3.5, a near
10 percent increase. In view of this, it is of interest to see what the data imply for the
population profiles for a broader set of countries. Figure (6) uses the data from Table A4.1
and plots the population profile for the seven groups of countries. The x-axis is the GDP
per capita in a given year relative to year 1700, which represents the stage of development of
each group. The data suggest that whereas the shapes of the population profile are similar
across countries, the peaks are very diﬀerent. More precisely, late developers have higher
peaks than early developers. While the population profiles of these countries do not aﬀect
their turning points, they may aﬀect the path of relative income.
In this paper, I focus on the role of barriers taking the profile of the population growth
rate as given without decomposing it into fertility and mortality. The interaction between
mortality and fertility have been widely studied. Recent work has emphasized the role
of mortality on the return to human capital and/or the role of mortality on the altuistic
parent’s precautionary demand for children (e.g., Ehrich and Lui (1991), Jones (1999), and
Tamura (2002b)). They argue that the falling mortality rate is the key driving force for the
falling fertility rate. This literature provides an explanation to why population growth is
increasing during the early development stage, and falling in the late development stage.13
The question then is why the population growth rate for the late developers reaches a higher
peak then for the early developers.14 Coale (1979) has documented for the case of Europe,
13 In a paper with human capital accumulation, Tamura (2002b) argues that the reason that the declining
population growth (and industrialization) happend sooner in the early developers is due to that fact that
the TFP of industry relative to agriculture is much higher for the early developers.
14Doepke (1999) endogenizes the fertility dynamics for the Hansen-Prescott (1999) model. However, by
assuming countries have the same population growth rate at their common turning point, the diﬀerences in
13
and Dyson and Murphy (1985) have documented for the case of other countries, that fertility
rates were also increasing during this period.15 On the other hand, Livi-Bacci (1997) shows
that mortality rates at the early development stage for the late developers are more or less
the same as European mortality rates. However, the fertility rates in developing countries
are considerably larger than those experienced in European countries, which suggests that
the diﬀerence in the peaks of population growth rate is due mainly to diﬀerential fertility
rates. Cultural, religious and policy diﬀerences that aﬀect the fertility decision may all
be important for understanding Figure (6). While understanding what accounts for these
diﬀerences is of interest in its own right, I will simply take these diﬀerences as exogenous
and examine their consequences for development.
I now allow the peak population growth rate to be one percent higher in the distorted
economy. In other words, all the parameters are the same as before exceptm (the parameter
corresponding to the peak population growth rate) is equal to 2.8 for the distorted economy.
As shown in Figure (7), the income ratio increases by more than 20 percent from period 6
to 9, and the maximum income ratio increases from 3.2 to 4, which is a 25 percent increase.
Thus, it confirms the intuition that diﬀerences in the population profiles between the early
and the later developers are important in accounting for their income diﬀerences.
6 Empirical Studies
In this section, I use the size of barriers implied by the diﬀerence in turning points to
compare the predicted income ratio with the income ratio in the data. To highlights the role
of barriers, I assume countries have the same preference and access to the same technology
throughout. Equation (9) then tells the relationship between the turning point, barriers and
the initial level of land per worker. With information on the diﬀerence in turning points,
I still have three unknowns, the ratio of the barriers to Malthus capital, the ratio of the
the peaks of the population growth rates cannot be addressed.
15This increase in the total fertility rate can be decomposed into changes in marriage behavior and changes
in marital fertility. Wrigley and Schofield (1981) provide evidence that in England, the marriage rate
increased and age of first marriage decreased during the initial stage of industrialization. Evidence from
the demography literature ( see Dyson and Murphy (1985) ), suggests that marital fertility was increasing
during the early development stage and that this increase was mainly due to changes in postpartum sexual
abstinence and duration of breast-feeding.
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barriers to Solow capital, and the ratio of the initial level of land per worker. One way to get
a solution is to make two assumptions: (1) countries have the same initial level of land per
worker (l0), and (2) the barriers are symmetric, or the barriers for Malthus capital (πm) are
equal to one. The size of barriers can then be derived from equation (12) . An alternative
way is to observe that the eﬀects of l0 and πm can be summarized by the income ratio along
the MBGP. This is because the turning point is derived by comparing the revenue of using
the Solow technology (the Solow TFP level) with its cost (the cost of capital and labor
along the MBGP), which is precisely what equation (8) says. I can rewrite this equation
using the equilibrium conditions for the prices as,
Asγ
t∗
s ≥ πθsyˆ1−θm D > Asγt
∗−1
s (14)
where D =
³
φ
vm1θ
´θ ³ µ
1−θ
´1−θ
. Thus l0 and πm are irrelevant for the diﬀerence in turning
points once the constant income ratio is known. The barriers to Solow capital can then be
derived from equation (14) using the observed diﬀerence in turning points and the income
ratio along the MBGP.
However, although I do not need separate information on πm and l0 to derive the barriers
to Solow capital, I need to know πm and l0 separately to calculate the subsequent income
path. In order to do this, I set πm equal to one because the capital share in the Malthus
technology is suﬃciently small to make πm virtually irrelevant. l0 can then be derived from
equation (7) . I now proceed to conduct the empirical exercises using the second way, i.e.
to derive the barriers to Solow capital and the initial land per worker using information on
the diﬀerence in turning points and the ratio of pre-modern growth income.16
6.1 The Seven Groups
I consider the seven groups in Figure 1 and calculate their average annual growth rates
using Table A4.1. The growth rate for Group 1 was below 0.2% for 1500-1600, 1600-1700,
and 1700-1800. It increased to 1% during 1820-1870. Following Maddison, I use 1820 as
16 In Ngai (2000), I have used the first method to study the income diﬀerences between UK, Japan and
Africa (using data from Lucas (1998)). For Africa and the UK, I found that the π implied by the diﬀerence
in turning points can account for about 70 percent of their current income diﬀerences. For Japan and the
UK, I considered the institution reforms in Japan and showed that the model can account for both the
Japanese miracle and the slowdown.
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the turning point for Group 1. Since one period in the model is 35 years, the turning points
for all other groups will be assigned to year 1855, 1890,..etc. Groups 2-5 all experienced
a growth rate of 1% during 1870-1913. But during 1820-1870, Groups 2 and 3 both have
growth rates around 0.5%, while the growth rates of Groups 4 and 5 are below 0.2%. Thus, I
assign 1855 as the turning point for both Groups 2 and 3, and 1890 for both Groups 4 and 5.
The turning point for Group 6 is 1925 since it reached a 1% growth rate during 1913-1950.
Finally, the turning point for Group 7 is 1960 given it reached a 1% growth rate during
1950-1973. The average income ratio between Group 1 and another group during 1500-1700
is used to match the income ratio along the MBGP of the model. Denote di = t∗i − t∗1 the
diﬀerence in the turning points of Group i and Group 1, πi the level of the barriers in Group
i relative to that of Group 1, and zi the average relative income of Group 1 to that of Group
i during 1500-1700 which can be calculated from Table A4.1 as
z2 z3 z4 z5 z6 z7
1.2 1.7 2.0 1.7 2.3 1.6
Given zi and di, the initial land per worker for Group i is equal to z
(1−φ)/(1−µ−φ)
i , and the
range of πi implied by equation (14) is
zi
³
γ1/(1−θ)s
´di
≥ πθ/(1−θ)i > zi
³
γ1/(1−θ)s
´di−1
. (15)
where πθ/(1−θ)i and γ
1/(1−θ)
s are the predicted income ratio and growth rate along the SBGP.
The benchmark economy is now calibrated to Group 1, thus the peak of the population
is adjusted to 1.3% as implied by Figure (6). This implies that population in 1995 is about
five times that in 1820 which matches that of Group 1. The other calibrated parameters
are the same as before except that θ = 0.5.17 This value of θ is larger than before but in
accordance with many authors, e.g. Parente and Prescott, who have argued that capital
shares should be higher than the canonical values because of unmeasured investment. The
parameters for any Group i are identical to that of Group 1 except for the barriers and the
initial land per worker. I calculate the barriers as the minimum value implied by equation
17Thus, γs and β are adjusted accordingly to match the growth rate and interest rate. The choice of θ will
mainly aﬀect the level of π but not the main result on income ratio. It is because the diﬀerence in turning
points is already given by the data. Moeover γs is adjusted to match the growth rate and so the income
ratio along the SBGP

πθ/(1−θ)

is always within the range given by equation (15) regardless of the level
of θ.
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(15) . The barriers derived are
π2 π3 π4 π5 π6 π7
1.5 2.0 4.0 3.5 9.5 13.5
I assume these barriers remain the same throughout the sample years. The results are
summarized in Table 3 which report the income ratio implied by the model as a percentage
of that in the data for the specified periods between 1820 to 1995. The periods are chosen
because data between years 1820-1950 are available only for years 1820, 1870, 1913 and
1950 for all seven groups. I use linear interpolation between the periods in the model to
compare the model with the data. For Group 2 (other Western European countries), the
income ratio predicted by the model matches the data very well for both the beginning and
end of the sample years, accounting for 80 percent of the income ratio. It falls short of the
data for the period 1913-1960 which covers the World War II. Given the implied relative
barrier is 1.5 for Group 2, the model predicts Group 2 is converging to Group 1 and reaches
an income ratio of 1.5 along the SBGP. In the data, the ratio of GDP per capita for Group
1 to that of Group 2 fluctuates between 1.55 to 1.67 for the period 1990-2001. The income
ratio predicted by the model for Group 4 (Latin America) is about 20 percent more than
in the data except for the period 1913-1960, during which the model’s prediction is 30-40
percent more than in the data. It could be due to the fact that the turning point for Group
4 is somewhere between the year 1855 to 1890, thus the barrier derived is on the high side.
For other groups, the model performs well for the period 1820-1960. But for the period
1960-1995, the predicted incomes for Groups 5 and 7 are too low relative to that of Group
1, and the predicted incomes for Groups 3 and 6 are too high relative to that of Group 1.
The reason that the predicted income is too high for Group 3 (Eastern Europe and Former
USSR) for the period 1960-1995 is that the GDP per capita for Group 3 actually fell in 1998
to half its level of 1990 for political reasons which are not in my model. The reason that
the predicted incomes are too low for Groups 5 and 7 is that I have assumed the barriers to
remain the same throughout the sample years. But these two groups contain most of the
countries (such as Japan and South Korea) that have experienced “growth miracles” during
this period. These miracle experiences are often associated with institutional reforms that
may have lowered the size of barriers.
So far I have assumed all groups are identical except for the level of initial income
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and barriers. But as shown in Fig(6), they have diﬀerent population growth rates during
their early development stage. In fact, for Group 6 (Africa), the peak population growth
rate is 3 percent during the period 1950-1995. Figure (8) reports the results of allowing a
higher peak population growth rate for Africa.18 It is interesting to note that, in contrast
to the balanced growth path approach, the model predicts that the income ratio between
Africa and Group 1 will continue to worsen even if relative barriers are unchanged. A large
fraction of this increase is due to the high population growth rate.19 With this adjustment,
the percentage of income ratio (Group1/Africa) predicted by the model increases from 71
percent to 84 percent for the period 1960-1995.
To sum up, the barriers that match the observed diﬀerences in turning points and the
pre-modern growth income ratio achieve the following: (1) it predicts ‘convergence’ among
the Western countries; (2) it accounts for a significant portion of the income ratio between
the current poor and current rich, especially when the diﬀerent population profiles are
taking into account.
6.2 Institutional Change
I now address the issue of institution changes that may have changed the size of barriers
and focus on individual countries. The benchmark economy is now interpreted as the
UK (a member of Group 1), which has similar population profile as that of the whole of
Group 1. I make comparison with Japan and Argentina, two countries that experienced
well-documented institutional changes.
The growth rate of the UK was below 0.3% before the period 1820-1870, thus 1820 is
also used as the turning point for the UK.20 I need a measure for the barriers along the
long run development path. The Penn World Table covers the price of capital starting from
18 I chose to study Africa as one unit since Maddison (1995, 2001) contains very few data for African
countries prior to 1950, for four sample countries in year 1913, and two out of the four sample countries in
year 1900. Moreover, they all have very similar population profiles.
19Note that the implied ratio of output per worker is higher than that of output per capita during the
period 1960-2135. In particular, for the benchmark case, the maximum ratio for output per worker is 12 and
for output per capita is 11. For the case with adjusted population profile, the maximum ratio for output
per worker is 18 and for output per capita is 14.
20There are some disagreement on the turning point of the UK, but since I am using the Maddison data,
I follow his choice of 1820.
18
year 1950. Collins and Williamson (1999) construct a panel database for 1870-1950 for
eleven OECD countries. Apart from Japan, the other countries are all from Group 1 who
have very similar long run development experiences.21 I focus on comparing the experience
of Japan with that of the UK (one of the 10 countries). Modern growth began in Japan
around the end of the 19th century. However, Japan’s GDP per capita exceeded that of the
UK in 1990. This rapid rate of catch up is due to the exceptionally high growth rate during
the postwar period. Its average growth rate was 8.1% during the period 1950-73, compared
to 2.4% for the UK. Growth slowed down after 1973 when its growth rate dropped to 2.3%
for (for 1973-2000).
To see the model’s predictions on the development experience of Japan relative to that
of the UK, I need a measure of relative barriers in Japan since the beginning of the modern
growth era. Based on the diﬀerence in their turning points and the ratio of their pre-modern
growth income, equation (15) can be used to derived the relative barriers in Japan when
both economies are in the pre-modern growth regime. However, this level of barriers did not
remain constant over time. The historical record suggests two episodes that significantly
lowered barriers in Japan. They are the Meiji Restoration in 1868 which ended Shogunate
Japan, and the postwar economic and institutional reforms. According to Yamamura (1977),
the new Meiji government adopted policies to encourage the absorption and dissemination
of western technologies and skills, and help the growth of private industries. Following
these policy changes, the fraction of workers employed in industry increased significantly in
1907. Postwar Japan also underwent many major reforms such as introducing numerous tax-
exemptions or tax-reliefs for investment; industry-financing programs; allowing the purchase
of new foreign patents; dissolving the zaibatsu system and the deconcentration of many
zaibatsu subsidiaries22; and trade liberalization (see Tsuru (1961) and Rotwein (1964)).
According to Ohkawa and Rosovsky (1963), these reforms led to a steep rise in the rate of
private investment and a rapid shift of resources from the agricultural to the nonagricultural
sector.
21The other ten countries are Australia, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Italy, Norway, Sweden,
Great Britain and the US.
22The “zaibatsu” refers to a relatively small number of family-dominated company systems holding assets
through large segments of the Japanese economy. These groups had become a major force in Japanese
economic and political life before World War II.
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These reductions in barriers are consistent with the data reported in Collins andWilliamson.
Based on their Tables (1a) and (1b), Figure (9a) plots the relative price of capital goods
and equipment in Japan where the relative price in 1900 is normalized to 100. Figure (9b)
plots the ratio of the relative prices in Japan to that of the UK using their Tables (2a) and
(2b). These two figures show that there are significant reductions in the relative prices in
Japan and their ratio relative to that of the UK. This evidence is consistent with the view
that barriers in Japan were reduced after the Meiji Restoration. For the postwar period,
Jones (1994) shows that the relative price of equipment in Japan relative to the UK is equal
to 0.7 (in 1980).
In view of these facts, I carry out the following exercise to account for the experience
of Japan relative to that of the UK. As Japan experienced a two-period delay compared to
the UK and its income for the period 1500-1700 is 54 percent of that in the UK, equation
(15) implies the range of the relative size of barriers in Japan to be between 3.8 and 7.7
in the pre-modern growth regime. Together with the evidence from Figures (9a) and (9b),
the relative size of barriers in Japan is then set to 4 initially. To capture the impact of
the Meiji restoration, the barriers are reduced by half in 1890, which matches the data in
Figures (9a) and (9b). Finally, the postwar reforms are captured by reducing the barriers
to 0.7 in 1960 based on the evidence in Jones (1994).
Table 4 compares the predictions of the model with the data for the specified periods
between 1820 to 2000. The model tracks the trend of the income ratio between the UK and
Japan very closely. It predicts both the divergence between Japan and UK prior to 1890
and the later convergence but the catch up of the Japanese economy happens at a slower
rate than in the data. There are two points to note. First, the income ratio for the period
1850-1925 is fairly stable though the barriers are reduced by half in 1890. This is because
the model predicts an inverted U-shape for the time path of the income ratio for a given
level of barriers. Therefore, if the level of barriers is reduced before the maximum income
ratio is reached, it will only cause the income ratio to increase at a smaller rate but not
necessarily reduce it. This is an interesting property of the model and is consistent with the
finding of Restuccia and Urrutia (2001) that the range of the relative price of investment is
decreasing for the period 1960-85 while the magnitude of the income ratio is not. Second,
the model implies both the Japanese miracle and the slowdown for the period 1960-2000
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with one single change in the level of barriers in 1960.23 Within a version of the neoclassical
growth model, Parente and Prescott (1994) interpret the miracle in Japan as a reduction
in its barriers to less than that of the US, while the subsequent slowdown is associated
with an increase in its relative size. They argue that Japan is converging to three diﬀerent
balanced growth paths, corresponding to the period before the miracle, during the miracle,
and the slowdown after the miracle, and they assume the existence of three diﬀerent levels
of barriers each corresponding to a steady state. I find, however, that the slowdown of the
Japanese economy after the miracle years can be obtained without increasing the relative
barriers, as part of the normal process of transition. The diﬀerence in our results highlight
the diﬀerence in my approach and the standard balanced growth approach in accounting for
international income diﬀerences. If we focus on balanced growth paths, diﬀerences of this
magnitudes can only be explained by exogenous shocks that change the balanced growth
equilibrium.
In contrast to the case of Japan, modern growth began in Argentina around the middle
of 19th century. The GDP per capita of the UK relative to that of the Argentina declined
from 2.1 in 1870 to 1.4 during 1900-1929, but started to rise since then. Díaz-Alejandro
(1970), and more recently Talyor (1994), dated this as the end of the Belle Époque. They
argue this is due to the dramatic rise in the price of capital goods in the post-1935 era
as a result of the interventionist political regime. These interventions include rationing,
controls and other distortions on machinery and equipment. Based on Table 3 in Taylor
(1994), Figure (10) plots the relative price of investment and two of its major components
(machinery and Durable Producers’ Equipment) in Argentina during the period 1935-1960.
It suggests that the average relative price of investment (equipment and machinery) for the
period 1939-60 is about 67 (92 and 65) percent higher than in the period 1935-38. Using the
data from Collins and Williamson (1999), the average relative price of capital (equipment)
for the period 1939-50 is about 20 (15) percent higher than in the period 1935-39. Therefore,
the initial relative level of barriers in Argentina is set to be 1.5 (to generate a one-period
delay) and increased in 1925 by 40 percent to 2.1.24 Table 5 compares the prediction of the
23The removal of barriers can only partly replicate the postwar miracle of Japan as the destruction of the
capital during the war is also an important factor.
24Díaz-Alejandro (1970) reports that the relative price of new machinery and equipment was between 2.5
and 3.3 times higher in Buenos Aires than in two major US cities for 1962. On the other hand, the relative
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model with the data in Maddison (1995 and 2000) for the specified period between 1870 and
1995. The model closely tracks the trend of the income ratio, i.e. it predicts convergence
prior to 1925 then divergence and slowdown in the Argentine economy for the period 1925-
1960 due to the increased barriers in 1925. The shortcoming is that the predicted growth
rate for the period 1960-1995 is too high compared to the data.
To conclude, the institutional changes can explain why Japan reaches a higher income
level than Argentina even though modern growth began later in Japan.
7 Conclusion
Recent studies have emphasized diﬀerences in the barriers to capital accumulation and
technology adoption as determinants of cross-country income diﬀerences, but they have
generally focused on steady states. In this paper I focus on the role of the barriers in
determining the beginning date and pace of modern economic growth. A fundamental
property of the model is that cross-country income diﬀerences exhibit an inverted U-shape
pattern over time, an important feature of long run economic data. A key implication of
my model is that a substantial fraction of existing income diﬀerences are transitional. The
transitional eﬀect increases significantly when I include the fact that today’s low-income
countries had higher population growth rates during the early development stage than did
the currently rich countries. I find interesting results in my empirical tests. I divide all
countries in Maddison’s dataset into seven groups and I find that the barriers that account
for their diﬀerences in turning points also account for a significant portion of their income
diﬀerences. The case of Japan and Argentina relative to the UK, which I used to study the
eﬀect of institutional change, illustrates how the model can explain both the growth miracle
and subsequent slowdown along the same development path.
The model abstracts from the fact that home production (the non-market sector) plays
an important role in the early development stage of economy. Parente, Rogerson and Wright
(2000) extend the standard barrier model to include home production. They find that the
measured income disparity along the balanced growth path increases significantly if market
price of machinery is 1.7 times higher in Argentina than in the UK in 1980 ( Jones (1994)). Restuccia and
Urrutia (2001) shows that the relative price of investment is 1.5 times higher in Argentina than in the UK
for the period 1960-85.
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and home produced goods are close substitutes and the capital share of the home production
technology is small. Incorporating home production in this model is expected to work in a
similar way as in their model.
Another interesting extension not pursued here is to allow for mortality risk and hu-
man capital accumulation, as in Tamura (2002b). One well-known development fact is the
positive correlation between average years of schooling and life expectancy across time and
countries. In the context of this paper, the exogenous barriers delay modern growth and in
turn delay the improvement in mortality, thus providing an endogenous barrier to human
and physical capital accumulation which can explain even more income diﬀerences.
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Appendix 1. Competitive Equilibrium This appendix derives the competitive equilibrium
which satisfies the three development stages under assumptions A1-A6 specified below.
Given πm, πs, N0,K0 andL, a competitive equilibrium consists of prices {qt, wt, rKmt, rKst, rLt};
firm allocations {Kmt,Kst, Nmt, Nst, Lmt, Ymt, Yst}; and household allocations {c1t, c2t+1, xmt, xst, lt+1},
such that (1) given prices, household and firm allocations maximize utility and profit; (2) all markets
clear
Ymt+Yst = Ntc1t+Nt−1c2t+Ntxt; Nmt+Nst = Nt; Kmt+Kst = Kt; Lmt = L = Nt−1lt
and (3) the laws of motion hold
Kmt+1 = Nt
xmt
πm
; Kst+1 = Nt
xst
πs
; Nt+1 = g(c1t)Nt.
The model can be solved for constant intertemporal elasticity of substitution utility, but I assume
A1 : u(c) = ln c
In equilibrium, c1t =
wt
1+β , and Rt =
qt+rLt
qt−1 if lt > 0; Rt =
rkst
πs if xst > 0; and Rt =
rkmt
πm if
xmt > 0.
Malthus Balanced Growth Path (MBGP) Function g (.) is chosen so that output per
worker (yˆm) and capital per worker (kˆm) are constant, where yˆm = Amγtmkˆ
φ
m
³
L
Nt
´1−µ−φ
is
constant if assume
A2 : g(cˆ1m) = γ
1/(1−φ−µ)
m and g(c1) > g(cˆ1m) ∀c1 ∈ [c1m, c1m + ] where  > 0,
then kˆmyˆm =
vm1
πm where vm1 =
1+β−µ−
√
(1+β−µ)2−4µφβ(1+β)
2(1+β)γ1/(1−µ−φ)m
, is the ratio for an economy with
πm = 1, and
yˆm =
h
Amγ
t
m (vm1/πm)
φ (L/Nt)
1−µ−φ
i1/(1−φ)
The price and rental rate of land grow at γ
1/(1−φ−µ)
m . The wage rate and rental rate of capital are
constant.
Transition A firm can write down his profit function if it starts using the Solow technology,
Ψ(rkmt, wt) = maxKst,Nst
³
Asγ
t
sK
θ
stN
1−θ
st − rkstKst − wtNst
´
The optimal decision of the firm implies KstNst =
θwt
(1−θ)rkst , so profit function becomes:
Ψ(rkmt, wt) = maxNst
·
Asγ
t
s(
θwt
(1− θ)rkst
)θ − wt
1− θ
¸
Nst
For household to invest in both capitals, rkstπs =
rkmt
πm ,
Ψ(rkmt, wt) = maxNst
"
Ast
µ
πm
πs
θwt
(1− θ)rkmt
¶θ
− wt
1− θ
#
Nst
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When on the MBGP, the firm will use the Solow technology if Ψ(rˆm, wˆm) ≥ 0,
Ast ≥
µ
πs
πm
rˆm
θ
¶θ µ
wˆm
1− θ
¶1−θ
Given K0 =
h
N
µ
0 L
1−φ−µ
³
vm1
πm
´i1/(1−φ)
, both rˆm and wˆm are functions of N0, the turning point
(t∗),
Asγ
t∗
s ≥ Bπθsπ−φ(1−θ)/(1−φ)m (L/N0)(1−µ−φ)(1−θ)/(1−φ) > Asγt
∗−1
s
where B =
³
φ
θ
´θ ³ µ
1−θ
´1−θ h
v
(φ−θ)
m1 A
(1−θ)
m
i1/(1−φ)
.
Given qt−1, Nt, L, and It ≡ Nt−1(wt−1 − c1t−1)− qt−1L, profit maximization implies
θYst
πsKst
=
φYmt
πmKmt
; wt = (1− θ)
Yst
Nst
= µ
Ymt
Nmt
; rLt = (1− φ− µ)
Ymt
L
which imply kmt =
πs
πmψkst, where kmt =
Kmt
Nmt , kst =
Kst
Nst , and ψ =
(1−θ)φ
θµ < 1 if assume
A3 : θ > φ
Market clearing implies πmkmt =
ψIt/Nt
1−(1−ψ)mt , where nmt =
Nmt
Nt . Labor indiﬀerence implies
k
θ−φ
mt =
µ
1− θ
Amt
Ast
µ
ψ
πs
πm
¶θ µ
L
Nmt
¶1−φ−µ
Thus the equilibrium n∗mt solves f (n
∗
mt) = 0 where
f (nmt) =
µ
1− θπ
θ
sπ
−φ
m ψ
φ (1− (1− ψ)nmt)θ−φ −
Ast
Amt
I
θ−φ
t N
1−θ−µ
t n
1−φ−µ
mt
and 1−µ−φ > 0 and t ≥ t∗ implies f 0 < 0, f (0) > 0 and f (1) < 0, thus there exists an unique
n∗mt ∈ [0, 1). Moreover, n∗mt converges to zero if AstAmt I
θ−φ
t N
1−µ−θ
t is increasing in t which is true
if assume
A4 : γs ≥ γm
A5 : ∃t¯, n, s.t. g (c1t) ≤ n ∀t > t¯ if 1− θ < µ
: g (c1t) ≥ 1 if 1− θ ≥ µ
Solow Balanced Growth Path (SBGP) As nmt → 0, both rLt → 0 and qt → 0. Assume,
A6 : lim
c1→∞
g (c1) = g,
the economy converges to a SBGP where output per worker (yst) is growing at a constant rate.
The capital-output ratio equal vs1/πs, where vs1 =
β(1−θ)
(1+β)gγ1/(1−θ)s
is the ratio for an economy with
πs = 1, and
yst =
³
Asγ
t
s (vs1/πs)
θ
´1/(1−θ)
The wage and consumption also grow at γ1/(1−θ)s .
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Appendix 2. Calibration This appendix give a brief review of the calibration in Hansen and
Prescott.
The economy with barriers equal to one is calibrated to match the development experience of
England before 1800 and the postwar development experience of the industrialized countries. A
period in this economy is 35 years in real time. Agents will therefore live for 70 years working
for the first 35 years of their life-span. The initial conditions, Am, As, L and N0 are set to be
one arbitrarily. Given N0, K0 is chosen such that the economy is initially on the MBGP. The
capital share of the Solow technology is chosen to match factor share in postwar US. The capital
share of the Malthus technology is set to 0.1. Labor shares are assume to be the same for both
technologies. The population growth rate for the pre-1800 period in the UK is used to calibrate γm,
and the relationship between the population growth rate and the GDP per capita for the industrial
economies is used to calibrate the function g (.) . A general pattern in the long run population data
can be summarized by
Figure A3.1. Population Growth Function
1
1 x1 x2
C 1 /C 1 m
m
It says that population growth rate first increases until the living standard is x1 times its
Malthusian level and the decreases to a constant level when the living standard is x2 times its
Malthusian level. The g (.) is then calibrated to this shape with x1 = 2, x2 = 18 and m = 2 where
m = 2 corresponds to a 2% average annual population growth rate. Finally, γs and β are chosen so
that the growth rate is around 2% for postwar periods, and interest rate is around 2% in Malthus
era and 4-4.5% for the postwar periods. To summarize, the parameter values are
θ µ φ γm γs β x1 x2 m
0.4 0.6 0.1 1.03 1.52 1 2 18 2
Given L,N0 and K0, qt is solved using the shooting algorithm described in Hansen and Prescott.
Appendix 3. Sensitivity Analysis I examine the robustness of the shape of Figure (6) with
respect to changes in parameters of the model. These parameters are initial population, quality of
land, initial TFP levels for the Malthus and Solow technologies, input shares for Malthus technology,
population growth rate along the Malthus balanced growth path, and the population growth function
g(c1). Figure A1 shows that doubling initial population, quality of land and
Am
As all have insignificant
eﬀects on the shape of the income ratio curve. Given the Malthus sector almost disappear three
periods after modern growth begins, both capital and land shares of the Malthus technology have
an insignificant eﬀect on the income ratio curve. Doubling the population growth rate along the
Malthus balanced growth path from 0.3 percent to 0.6 percent will increase γm from 1.03 to 1.07.
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This again is insignificant in determining the income ratio curve since consumption is doubled two
periods after modern growth begins, and after this point γm does not enter into g(c1). I check the
robustness of shape of income diﬀerence by varying x1, x2 and m. Figure A2 shows that both x1
and x2 have an insignificant eﬀect on the maximum income ratio but m has a significant eﬀect. By
increasing the maximum annual population growth rate from 2% to 3% (m = 2 to m = 2.81), the
maximum income ratio is increased from 3.2 to 3.5 (a nearly 10 percent increase).
Figure A3.1. Initial Conditions
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Figure A3.2. Population Profile
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Appendix 4. Data Appendix Data are from Maddison (2001) which includes population, GDP
and GDP per capita for 124 individual countries, as well as regional, subregional and the world total.
The seven groups are diﬀerent from the seven regions of Maddison, the definition of each group are
as follow:
Group 1 includes 4 Western Oﬀshoots and 12 Western European countries. The Western Oﬀ-
shoots are Australia, New Zealand, Canada, and United States. The Western European Countries-
Austria, Belgium Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzer-
land and the United Kingdom.
Group 2 includes 17 other western European countries. They are Ireland, Greece, Portugal,
Spain and other 13 small western European countries.
Group 3 includes 7 Eastern European countries and 15 Successor States of the Former USSR.
The Eastern European countries are Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia (a) Czech Republic and
Slovakia from 1990), Hungary, Poland, Romania and Former Yugoslavia. The Successor States of the
Former USSR are Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Estonia, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia,
Lithuania, Moldova, Russian Federation, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan.
Group 4 includes 44 Latin American countries. They are Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia,
Mexico, Peru, Uruguay, Venezuela, Bolivia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Sal-
vador, Guatemala, Haiti,Honduras, Jamaica, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Puerto Rico, Trinidad
& Tobago, and other 21 small Caribbean countries.
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Group 5 includes Japan only.
Group 6 includes 57 African countries. They are Algeria, Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burk-
ina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Congo,
Cote d’Ivoire, Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea &Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau,
Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Morocco, Mozambique,
Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Reunion, Rwanda, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Africa,
Sudan, Swaziland, Tanzania, Togo, Tunisia, Uganda, Zaire, Zambia, Zimbabwe, and other 6 coun-
tries.
Group 7 includes 40 East Asian countries and 15 West Asian countries. The East Asian countries
are China, India, Indonesia, Philippines, South Korea, Thailand, Taiwan, Bangladesh, Burma, Hong
Kong, Malaysia, Nepal, Pakistan, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Afghanistan, Cambodia, Laos, Mongolia,
North Korea, Vietnam, and 19 small countries. The West Asian countries are Bahrain, Iran, Iraq,
Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Turkey, UAE, West Bank and
Gaza, and Yemen.
Table A4.1. GDP per Capita and Population for Seven Groups
1500 1700 1820 1870 1913 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 1998
GDP per capita (1990 International Dollars)
Group 1 775 1041 1269 2168 4203 6753 9075 12593 15934 19554 22518
Group 2 657 850 994 1253 1986 2374 3413 6824 9164 11725 13980
Group 3 483 592 667 917 1501 2601 3663 5183 6236 6446 3893
Group 4 416 437 665 698 1511 2554 3167 4016 5413 5055 5795
Group 5 500 520 669 737 1387 1926 3988 9715 13429 18778 20541
Group 6 400 400 418 444 585 876 1046 1332 1496 1396 1384
Group 7 572 571 575 543 640 713 1032 1536 2036 2781 3565
Population (millions)
Group 1 51 71 125 208 339 433 485 537 575 611 645
Group 2 9 13 18 25 33 48 52 56 62 64 66
Group 3 30 45 91 141 236 267 313 351 382 411 412
Group 4 18 12 21 40 81 166 218 286 362 443 508
Group 5 15 27 31 34 52 84 94 104 117 124 126
Group 6 46 61 74 90 125 227 283 361 473 627 767
Group 7 268 375 679 731 926 1382 1687 2093 2580 3103 3516
Table A4.2 GDP per Capita for Individual Countries (1990 International Dollars)
1600 1700 1820 1870 1913 1950 1973 1998
United Kingdom 974 1250 1707 3191 4921 6907 12022 18714
Argentina* 430 505 623 1311 3797 4987 7973 9219
Japan 520 570 669 737 1387 1926 11439 20413
China 600 600 600 530 552 439 839 3117
India 550 550 533 533 673 619 853 1746
*The GDP per capita for Argentina is the same as Other Latin American for 1600-1820 (Maddison Table B-21)
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Table 1: Income Ratio (θ = 4)
Barriers Delay BGP Level Maximum Level Percent Increased
4 2 2.5 3.2 28
8 2 4 5.3 33
16 3 6.3 8.8 40
32 4 10 14.1 41
64 4 16 23 44
Table 2: Combinations of θ and Barriers for Factor 30 Income Ratio
θ   Delay Barriers ( BGP ) Barriers ( Transition ) Percent Reduced
0.4 4 164 96 41
0.45 4 64 40 38
0.5 4 30 18 40
0.55 3 16 10 38
0.6 3 10 6.5 35
Table 3: Percentage of Income Ratio Predicted by the Model
Group 2 Group 3 Group 4 Group 5 Group 6 Group 7
1820-1870 90 88 115 104 102 98
1870-1913 77 78 123 99 103 107
1913-1950 66 78 140 119 100 102
1950-1960 55 78 130 113 89 94
1960-1995 83 70 115 272 71 126
Table 4: Prediction for Japan
Growth Rate of GDP per Capita (Japan) Ratio of GDP per Capita (UK/Japan)
Data Model Data Model
1820-1850 0.2 0.1 2.9 2.9
1850-1890 0.9 1.4 4.2 3.4
1890-1925 1.8 2.6 3.5 2.9
1925-1960 2.2 2.1 2.9 2.3
1960-1995 4.7 3.6 1.2 1.7
Miracle and Slowdown
1960-1973 8.4 5.1 1.5 1.8
1973-2000 2.3 3.1 0.9 1.3
Table 5. Prediction for Argentina
Growth Rate of GDP per Capita (Argentina) Ratio of GDP per Capita (UK/Argentina)
Data Model Data Model
1870 2.4 2.1
1870-1900 2.5 1.8 1.8 1.7
1900-1925 1.4 1.6 1.4 1.6
1925-1960 1.0 1.4 1.5 1.7
1960-1995 1.1 1.8 1.8 1.9
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Figure 1: GDP per Capita for 7 Groups
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Figure 2: GDP per Capita for Individual Countries
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Figure 3: Fraction of Labor in the Malthus Sector
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Figure 6: Population profile
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Figure 7: Ratio of Output per Worker (Diﬀerent Population Profiles)
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Figure 8: Predicted Ratio of GDP per capita (Group1/Africa)
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Figure 9: Historical Relative Prices in Japan
Figure 9a. Relative Prices in Japan (1900 =100)
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Figure 9b. Ratio of Relative Prices (Japan/UK)
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Figure 10: Relative Prices in Argentina (1935-38 = 100)
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